State of the Rebalance

Thomas Hubbard, US State Department/Korea Society/McLarty Associate
May 23,2014

President Obama’s recent trip to Asia was a timely, perhaps necessary, reminder that the “rebalance” to Asia remains an important pillar of US foreign policy despite the distraction of immediate crises elsewhere in the world. During an unusually lengthy eight-day trip, Obama visited three treaty allies—Japan, Korea, and the Philippines—and a long-neglected friend, Malaysia. Reacting to the first stop in Japan, US media tended to focus on what the trip did not achieve—a clear-cut breakthrough toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the central economic component of the rebalance. That was unfortunate, but the real message of this trip was security, and the principal audience was allies and friends seeking assurance that the United States will stand by its commitments at a time of profound regional change. The visit was also intended as a strong signal to China, whose assertive actions across a broad front have shaken the region. The strong security thrust resonated well in all of the countries visited and produced concrete results that will strengthen the US ability to contribute to regional security. It remains to be seen whether this strong demonstration of allied solidarity will have a positive effect on China’s behavior.

Japan: Enhanced Alliance, but Too Soon for Trade Deal

An Obama visit to Japan was long overdue. As one who participated in President Clinton’s 1996 visit to Japan, I was surprised to realize that this was the first state visit by an American president since then (an anomaly caused largely by the frequent turnover in Japanese leaders.) This trip was a timely opportunity to build ties with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who is likely to be in office for several more years, and to reinforce his efforts to upgrade Japan’s defense posture. The shadow of an assertive China loomed large over the talks, as it did elsewhere on the trip. The keynote was Obama’s clear indication that the United States considers the disputed Senkaku Islands, long administered by Japan, to fall squarely under the defense commitments embodied in our Mutual Security Treaty. Successive secretaries of state and defense have voiced this commitment, but this is the first time this commitment to come to Japan’s aid in the event of an attack against the Senkakus was explicitly stated by a president. With an eye toward China, Obama was careful to say the United States takes no stand on ultimate sovereignty over the islands and to urge both sides to exercise restraint, but the message was clear. Obama also took the occasion to support steps Abe is taking to enhance Japan’s ability to contribute to the military alliance. Recognizing that both China and South Korea have chosen to portray these steps as a return to militarism, Obama urged Abe to move forward in a transparent manner that does not cause tensions with neighboring countries and made clear the US wish that Abe avoid symbolic steps, such as further visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, that would exacerbate tensions.

The US side wanted more concrete economic results. In the run-up to the visit, US officials did little to hide their hope that a breakthrough on market access for agricultural products and automobiles would give a boost to the broader TPP negotiations. Recognizing that the US-Japan talks are in many ways the main event, other TPP parties have been awaiting two critical developments: 1) US steps toward securing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) from Congress; and 2) achievement of a US-Japan deal on marker access for automobiles and agricultural products. The United States was hopeful that a breakthrough with Japan would make it possible to overcome widespread opposition to TPA on the part of congressional Democrats; it gambled that TPP was so central to Abe’s “three arrow” program of economic reform that he would make the necessary tough decisions on agricultural imports even in the absence of assurance that Congress would ultimately back TPP. That gamble failed, neither leader being prepared at this stage to compromise domestic interests. Following talks that took up the better part of Obama’s time in Japan, US officials tried to project optimism, asserting that the two parties were able to lay a pathway for eventual success and thereby inject fresh momentum into the larger TPP talks. Talks continue both bilaterally and multilaterally, but the failure to achieve a deal in Tokyo did little to dispel the widespread view in Asia that there will be no TPP deal until after the US mid-term elections.

Korea: A Necessary Gesture

The White House did not initially plan a stop in Korea, since Obama had already visited Korea three times and also hosted President Park for an official visit to Washington, but Obama wisely decided to add Seoul to his itinerary, recognizing that a stopover there would underscore solidarity in dealing with North Korea and, perhaps, add momentum to his efforts to reduce tensions between Japan and South Korea. As it transpired, the visit offered an opportunity to express solidarity with a Korean public profoundly racked with remorse over the death of more than 250 high school students in a ferry accident. Koreans were deeply moved by Obama’s expressions of sympathy.

North Korea did its part to add excitement to the visit. Obama arrived in Seoul just after a series of North Korean short and medium-range missile tests and amidst new signs of preparations for a fourth underground nuclear weapons test. Against this backdrop, the two presidents focused largely on affirming the US-ROK alliance. Among other things, Obama agreed to a longstanding Korean request to review a decision by their predecessors to turn wartime command of combined forces to a Korean general. In order to reinforce the importance of the joint posture, Obama and Park also conducted the first joint presidential visit to the Combined Command at Yongsan Garrison since its establishment 40 years ago. The North Koreans reacted with vituperative blasts at both leaders for preparing for war.

Malaysia: Finally a Presidential Visit

No US president had visited Malaysia, an important trading partner, since Lyndon Johnson; both Clinton and Obama had postponed scheduled visits. As with his culturally appropriate condolence gestures in Korea, Obama displayed his affinity for Malay culture (he actually speaks the national language the Malays share with Indonesia) to charm a proud public still stung by negative international attention to its government’s poor handling of the Malaysian Airlines disappearance.

Although the two states have long engaged in quiet defense cooperation, there was a time when Malaysia would have been uncomfortable with being grouped with three US treaty allies. Yet, both sides are now describing their ties as a “comprehensive partnership,” a new phase in relations that is possible in part because Malaysia wants deeper and more rewarding economic ties with the United States, but also because Kuala Lumpur sees the value of America’s security role in the Pacific. Malaysia’s decision to join the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as Prime Minister Najib Razak’s strong support for TPP despite considerable political opposition at home were important concrete outcomes of this long-overdue visit to Malaysia.

The Philippines: Towards a More Functional Alliance

Obama had also planned to visit the Philippines at the time of the government shutdown late last year, a visit that was originally to highlight its recent success in combatting corruption and promoting economic growth—at around seven percent, the highest in Southeast Asia over the past couple of years. Since then, the Philippines has grappled with the effects of a devastating typhoon and become increasingly concerned over Chinese incursions into disputed islands and waters. Thus, the security focus of the visit was welcomed by both Manila and Washington. In the most concrete result of the entire Asia trip, Obama and President Aquino presided over the conclusion of a new military agreement, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (ECDA), which, among other things, will allow regular rotation of US military personal through US-controlled facilities within Philippine military bases. Long under negotiation, ECDA will facilitate the most significant presence of US forces since the Philippines kicked the United States out of the Clark and Subic bases in 1992 and send a clear signal of the US intent to help it develop greater ability to defend its interests in the South China Sea.

Unlike the case with Japan and the Senkakus, the applicability of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea is less than finite, and Obama pointed out that the United States takes no stand on sovereignty over the disputed islands. However, he sent a clear signal to the Chinese that it is not neutral when it comes to provocative steps affecting allies in disputed territories. To underscore that point, Obama endorsed the Philippine decision, strongly opposed by China, to seek a ruling on China’s entire “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea by the UN Law of the Sea tribunal.

Impact on China

The presidential visits as a whole revealed, without a doubt, that China’s assertion of ambitious territorial claims in the region has rattled smaller neighbors and consolidated determination in countries to make the most of the US counterbalance to China. While Obama tried to show balance at each stop, the security-dominated visit may have strengthened the widespread misperception among officials and the public in China that the United States is manipulating Asian countries, Japan included, to contain China’s modernization and deny China what it considers to be its rightful place in the world. Although China appears prepared to adjust tactically to the ebbs and flows of its maritime disputes, particularly with regard to the most dangerous dispute with Japan, its strategic direction is clear: relentless pursuit of expansive territorial claims and rejection of international standards, including binding arbitration as a means of peacefully resolving such disputes. A recent regional agreement on rules of the road for naval encounters is positive, but there is scant evidence that the Chinese are willing to accept the nuanced position Obama delivered during the visit. Rather, Beijing is likely to continue to look for opportunities to consolidate its claims, as it did by towing a heavily guarded oil rig into waters disputed with Vietnam. That provocative move led to violent encounters with Vietnamese vessels and deadly anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam, which destroyed a considerable amount of Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese property. The ramifications of this outburst will keep maritime claims in the South China Sea on the front burner for some time to come.

The Future

Stasis in the TPP talks, combined with preoccupation with the China challenge, made it inevitable that this trip would be dominated by security developments. Yet, in the longer term, success of the rebalance to Asia will depend not just on security pledges but equally importantly on confidence in our capacity to carry them out. It was fortunate that this trip finally took place at a time when the austerity mood in Washington is palpably diminishing, particularly with regard to defense spending. Asian confidence in US defense commitments is also heavily dependent on how it fulfills commitments and exercises leadership elsewhere in the world. In this sense, it was a healthy signal to Asians that the president both made his promised trip to Asia despite the pressing crisis in Europe and was seen in each capital he visited to be actively engaged in leading the international response to Russian aggression. Finally, the rebalance to Asia will not succeed without a strong economic component, and TPP is the central element. The TPP negotiations may not go far before the mid-term elections, but it is important that Obama thereafter engage his personal prestige and energy to achieving this agreement that will lay the basis for US economic engagement with the world’s most dynamic region.